Autonomics: In Search of a Foundation for Next Generation Autonomous
  Systems by Harel, David et al.
  
Autonomics: In Search of a Foundation for Next Generation 
Autonomous Systems 
 
David Harel1, Assaf Marron1 and Joseph Sifakis2 
1 Weizmann Institute of Science, Rehovot, Israel 
2 Univ. Grenoble Alpes, Verimag laboratory, St Martin d’Heres, France 
 
david.harel@weizmann.ac.il   assaf.marron@weizmann.ac.il   joseph.sifakis@imag.fr 
 
Abstract  
The potential benefits of autonomous systems have been driving intensive development of such 
systems, and of supporting tools and methodologies. However, there are still major issues to be 
dealt with before such development becomes commonplace engineering practice, with accepted 
and trustworthy deliverables. We argue that a solid, evolving, publicly available, community-
controlled foundation for developing next generation autonomous systems is a must. We discuss 
what is needed for such a foundation, identify a central aspect thereof, namely, decision-making, 
and focus on three main challenges: (i) how to specify autonomous system behavior and the 
associated decisions in the face of unpredictability of future events and conditions and the 
inadequacy of current languages for describing these; (ii) how to carry out faithful simulation and 
analysis of system behavior with respect to rich environments that include humans, physical 
artifacts, and other systems,; and (iii) how to engineer systems that combine executable model-
driven techniques and data-driven machine learning techniques. We argue that autonomics, i.e., 
the study of unique challenges presented by next generation autonomous systems, and research 
towards resolving them, can introduce substantial contributions and innovations in system 
engineering and computer science.  
1 Introduction  
Many autonomous systems are already able to replace humans in carrying out a variety of 
functions. This trend will continue in the years to come, resulting in autonomous systems 
becoming a central and crucial part of human society in numerous areas. These will include 
vehicles of all kinds, medical and industrial robots and assistants, agricultural and manufacturing 
facilities, and distributed management for traffic, urban security, electric grids, etc.  
Many organizations are already striving to develop trustworthy, cost-effective autonomous 
systems. To make this possible, powerful tools and methods are being researched. However, due 
to the expected increase in both autonomy and criticality of such systems, we believe that the 
required trustworthiness is not achievable with current practices [25]. Consider, for example, even 
a very modest autonomous system, a valet-parking robot – obviously a far cry from a full 
autonomous vehicle. Customers and regulators would be fully justified in asking whether the robot 
will be able to discover a child forgotten in the car, or notice that a house pet is sleeping underneath 
a parked vehicle. And if the robot is indeed able to notice these, what will it do as a result? How 
  
will the robot react if a human attempts to stop it by pursuing it and yelling, or by blocking its 
way? Developers of such systems must not only solve such challenges and have good answers 
when asked about such scenarios; they must be able to readily convince wide audiences that their 
systems can be trusted under a wide range of unexpected, not-yet-articulated conditions.   
We argue that such development challenges cannot be dealt with by enhancing the system's safety 
features and merely adding, say, sensors, dedicated safety or decision making components, and 
test cases. The new levels complexity and criticality present fundamental new challenges for 
researchers, engineers, and regulators. The challenge can be summarized as follows:  
Next-generation autonomous systems will be expected to operate under conditions which 
will be unpredictable at the time of their development. This unpredictability is due to the 
limited controllability over the system’s environment, the emergence of new objects, 
properties and events in the world, and the exponential explosion of the number of 
composite configurations of such conditions and events. How can engineers assure 
customers and regulators that the system will function correctly and safely, before many 
complex conditions are even conceived? Matters are further complicated by the facts that 
many conditions which can be conceived still cannot be described with current 
languages, and when they can be described, it is not clear what instructions one should 
give the systems for handling then. 
We believe that to close this gap between the challenges in developing trustworthy next-generation 
autonomous systems and the existing research and technologies (in fields like programming 
languages, formal methods, system engineering, automation, control, artificial intelligence and 
machine learning, smart-agent and multi-agent systems) our community needs to construct a 
common engineering foundation for developing such systems. This autonomics foundation will 
study the unique challenges presented by next generation autonomous systems, and provide 
engineering principles, methods, tools and examples, as well as means for selecting among 
multiple design alternatives. Such a foundation will dramatically accelerate the development and 
acceptance of high quality, certifiable autonomous systems, built for the benefit of human society.  
In Section 2, we describe the principles we believe will characterize next-generation autonomous 
systems, and how they differ from those of present-day systems. The section will offer a basis and 
common terminology for the rest of the paper. In Section 3, we zoom in on one particular aspect 
of the broad problem – the development of decision-making processes, and identify three key gaps:  
(i) specifying autonomous system behavior and the decisions to be made therein, when working 
under unpredictable evolving environments, and validating that the resulting decisions will indeed 
meet what the users would have wanted the system to do; (ii) carrying out adequate simulations 
and analysis that would serve to validate a system's actual decisions as observed under complex 
situations; and (iii) designing means for hybrid decision-making that combines data-based 
techniques (based on AI and machine learning) with algorithmic, executable model-based ones. In 
Section 4 we provide a brief review of related work, in an attempt to recognize the vast amount of 
work that has already done, and at the same time support our argument about the remaining 
challenges.  
  
2 Characterizing Next Generation Autonomous Systems  
2.1 Basic Terminology 
We first define our basic terms and concepts, in order to set a common ground for the ensuing 
discourse (see also [24, 26]). We illustrate these with an example of an autonomous vehicle for 
factory-floor and plant yard deliveries (termed here FFAV).  
 Systems are the main subject of study in this paper, and are the artefacts that development 
teams are out to develop. A system works within an external environment, and it consists 
of two types of components, agents and objects, which, as we shall see, operate within a 
common internal system environment. The coordinated collective behavior of the system's 
agents and objects is designed to meet some global, system-wide, goals.   
 
 Objects are those components whose behavior is not affected during system development. 
For example, objects of the FFAV system may include OEM-made components, such as a 
motor, a set of cameras, or a steering mechanism controlling the angle of the front wheels 
whose input is just the desired angle or a turning force (as opposed to making the decision 
to what angle to turn the wheels). A system often also interacts with objects that are not 
part of it, but are part of the environment. Such are, in the case of the FFAV, machines on 
the factory floor (which may serve as mere obstacles, or as recipients of deliveries), 
packages to be delivered, and a website from which software updates may be automatically 
downloaded. Objects have states, which can be changed by agents or by other objects, or 
can change ‘spontaneously’, for their own internal reasons.  
 
 Agents are the main elements of an autonomous system. They are those components that 
are designed (programmed, built) as part of the system’s development process.1 Agents 
have agency: they are proactive and pursue specific goals which may change dynamically. 
Agents can monitor objects from the internal and external environments and can change 
their states, They can also coordinate their own actions with other agents. Thus, the FFAV 
system may either have a single agent for all its functions, or separate agents for different 
tasks, such as work scheduling, route planning, travel control, gripping and carrying, and 
delivery control. Agents can themselves be autonomous systems, and can, in turn, 
hierarchically contain other agents and systems.   
 
 The internal environment is the lower-level physical and virtual infrastructure used by 
the system's agents and objects. It may include the computer/processor/memory, batteries 
and other power sources, the operating system, communication hardware and software, 
data-base management software, etc.   
 
                                                 
1 We ignore here the question of whether a given component, already developed and then incorporated ‘as is’ into the 
system, should be considered as an agent or an object thereof. Similarly, we sidestep the question of whether agents 
that are part of systems in the external environment, like those of autonomous manufacturing machines in the context 
of the FFAV, should be considered agents or objects. 
  
 The external environment of a system (often referred to simply as its environment), is 
the collection of all entities with which the system might interact.  It may include other 
systems (with their objects and agents), stand-alone objects, and any other physical or 
virtual entities that may affect, or be affected by, the system's behavior, via, e.g., sensors 
and actuators, or in other ways. 
 The ecosystem is a general term that we use, when discussing the operation of a system in 
the actual world, to stand for a collection of physical and virtual entities that include the 
system and its external environment, and any other entities that may be relevant to such a 
discussion.  
2.2 Characterizing Autonomous Behavior 
We say that a system or an agent (for simplicity, we shall stick to system below) manifests 
autonomous behavior if it embodies the following five behavioral functions, and these are carried 
out with little or no intervention from humans or from other systems.  
Two functions are combined to enable the system to build for itself a useful representation of the 
state of the external environment. Perception is the function needed to input stimuli, interpret their 
basic meaning, remove ambiguity and vagueness from complex inputs, yielding relevant 
information. Perception often employs, in addition to data from other systems,  multi-modal inputs, 
such as vision, sound, heat, touch, radar, and data communication from other systems, which are 
obtained using mode-specific sensors and input devices. The system then amalgamates the 
received information. The second function is Reflection, which uses the information provided by 
the Perception function to create and constantly update an integrated run-time model representing 
the system's environment and its states. This model will then be used in on-going decision making.  
Two other functions constitute together the system’s adaptive decision process. Being adaptive 
means that decisions consider many possibly conflicting goals, in a way that depends on the current 
state of the environment. The Goal Management function chooses from among the set of goals 
the ones that are relevant to the current situation. The second function is Planning, which, 
computes a plan to achieve the set of goals produced by Goal Management, subject to state-
dependent constraints. The plan is the agent’s action in response to the current environment state, 
and may consist of, e.g., a sequence of commands to be executed by actuators.  
The fifth function that characterizes autonomous behavior is Self-Adaptation. This is the 
possibility of dynamic adjustment, over time, of the system's goals and the goal management and 
planning processes, through learning and reasoning, based on the evolving state of the system and 
its environment.   
 
2.3 How Next Generation Autonomous Systems Differ From Existing Systems 
Next-generation autonomous systems, both those that are already beginning to emerge and 
definitely those of the future, differ from existing systems in the several key aspects.    
  
1. They have a large variety of possibly-conflicting system goals.  A typical next generation 
autonomous system will not be focused on a small number of well-defined goals, such as 
winning a game of chess, or a vehicle reaching a destination without collisions and without 
breaking the law. Instead, such systems will normally face a far wider and more elaborate 
set of goals, as humans often do. Consider, for example, the FFAV making a highly critical 
(and expensive) delivery, which may be at risk due to a safety issue. The difficult decision 
is further complicated by the business and legal considerations and risks of the company 
that made (and programmed) the FFAV2.To some extent, the existence multiple, possibly 
conflicting, goals reflects the transition from “weak AI” to “strong AI”, which contrasts 
specific problem-solving with devising general decision methods for complex 
combinations of goals. However, we believe that strong AI is not a prerequisite to 
trustworthy autonomous systems of the future: individual systems will be able to solve 
complex issues as in the above FFAV example, even without having at their disposal 
general strong AI solutions.  
 
2. Their environment is dramatically less predictable. Autonomous systems under 
development already have to deal with a multitude of known environment configurations; 
e.g., for an autonomous vehicle, combinations of road-intersection topology, traffic 
volume, various driver profiles, and even the urgency of completing the trip at hand. These 
kinds of considerations can probably be weighed and reconciled using current or near-term 
technology. In contrast, next generation autonomous vehicles will face far more complex 
issues, which human drivers handle routinely but autonomous system will have a hard time 
tackling.  Such hard-to-predict issues (which are also hard-to-specify and hard-to-handle 
when predicted) include, e.g., the whims of bicycle and motorcycle riders, weaving in and 
out of traffic on roads, sidewalks and crosswalk; police instructions, whether spoken or 
signaled; poorly marked temporary diversions; and, emergencies which have not yet been 
handled by first responders, such as a traffic accident, a landslide/rock-fall or flooding; or, 
an urgent request by a passenger to stop and step out, but where there is no safe place to 
do so. And, when a human is called upon to intervene and help in a difficult decision, the 
system must be able to handle communication issues, human inattention, or even confusion 
and indecision. Further, many of these conditions can happen together with each other.   
 
The causes of this increase in difficulty in autonomous system design include: (a) increased 
dependency on (hard-to-predict) physical aspects of the environment, and sensitivity to 
changes therein; (b) increased mobility (and an increase in sheer numbers), yielding 
encounters with a multitude of diverse physical locations with their own unpredictable 
conditions; (c) increased physical distribution of a multi-component system, creating 
complex combination of states at all the relevant locations; (d) increased exposure to 
adversarial human actions, which includes, among other things, systematic exploration of 
system vulnerabilities and of ways to generate undesired system behavior.     
 
                                                 
2 Compare this with the difficulty of a human in choosing between two options, considering not only on the merits 
and risks of these options, but also personal ramifications, should others disagree with their choice.   
  
3. They require rich collaboration with humans. The human-interfaces needed for next-
generation autonomous systems will far exceed what is available in classical HCI, which 
is typically geared towards the trained user or operator controlling an automated task. 
Future interfaces will have to deal with the overall behavior of the system as seen, heard 
and otherwise sensed by humans, with the way the system affects human behavior and with 
the way humans think about system behavior (e.g., risk consideration). One thing that 
drives this shift is that future system missions will affect and put at risk a far wider circle 
of people. To illustrate these issues consider a traffic jam caused by an autonomous vehicle 
on a busy highway, the autonomous piloting of a plane, an autonomous crane in a busy 
construction site in a city center, or a medical-supply delivery robot, scurrying in a crowded 
hospital corridor.  
A second driver of complexity is that because a system will operate in an everyday human 
environment, its behavior will not only have to be functional, efficient and safe, but will 
have to appear to be so, and to instill in humans the confidence that it is indeed so. Thus, 
if human drivers and pedestrians will avoid passing robots or autonomous vehicles more 
than they avoid other pedestrians or human-driven vehicles at present, or conversely, they 
will allow themselves to take more liberties with such autonomous systems, then these 
systems will in fact be interfacing with humans in wholly new ways. And this is, of course, 
true not only for avoiding collisions: humans will routinely be interacting with machines 
on numerous everyday routines like negotiating the right-of-way through an office door, 
or pointing out a spill on the floor to a passing cleaning assistant.  
A third factor is collaboration. The human-computer interface is no longer just a display 
and keyboard---it becomes what the autonomous systems does and what it can understand. 
If the FFAV has to hand a delicate package to a human, and take from them another 
package, how does it communicate intentions (e.g., its desire to hand over one package and 
receive another), its questions (e.g., has the human recipient already secured a hold on the 
first package?), its state (e.g., that it is now holding the second package safely so that the 
human’s hold and attention is no longer needed), etc.  
Fourth, special attention has to be given to those parts of the interface that allow a human 
to interrupt the operation of the autonomous system or change it abruptly. If a worker just 
dropped a contact lens that the FFAV cannot see, how does he/she immediately stop it? If 
workers gave the FFAV a wrong package, how do they call it back? If some emergency 
work blocks the normal, pre-programmed route of the FFAV, and a detour cannot be just 
discovered by trial and error exploration, how does one give the FFAV an alternate, ad-
hoc instruction like "use the handicap ramp behind building C"?    
 
2.4 The Issue is not Executable Models vs. Machine Learning  
The differences between machine learning, data-driven techniques, and those based on model-
driven executable specifications, are an important ingredient of this paper, and of the proposed 
autonomics foundation. However, we do not focus on these differences, but, rather, on the 
challenges in the development of next generation autonomous systems as described above. To 
illustrate this “difference between differences”, we claim that even if next generation autonomous 
systems were to use only model-based and traditional procedural programming approaches, or, if 
  
all machine learning open issues,  including accuracy, explainability, correctness proofs, 
vulnerabilities, etc., were to be resolved, many of the challenges we discuss would remain.  
 
 
3 Why do We Need a New Foundation? 
The main claim in this paper is that there are fundamental issues that need to be addressed for the 
development of trustworthy next-generation autonomous systems, but which have not yet been 
dealt with adequately by present research or by industrial experience. We call upon the research 
and engineering community, both in academia and in industry, to create and evolve a foundation 
for developing such systems. This foundation will recommend engineering practices and methods, 
point at tools and technologies, and offer open-source bases or examples. It will also include meta-
information, such as reliable means for selecting among various system design and development 
alternatives.  While the autonomics foundation should touch upon all aspects of system 
engineering, including requirements, design, development, validation/verification/testing, 
certification and data collection, it should not aim to rewrite well-accepted system engineering 
principles. Instead it should be built (and perhaps also organized) to address the ‘burning’ issues 
and questions in engineering next generation autonomous systems. 
To reinforce the argument about the depth and urgency of the required foundation, we focus in this 
section on one central aspect, which is at the very heart of autonomous system engineering – the 
decision-making. We present three partially-overlapping challenges that engineers face when 
developing decision-making processes, and for which satisfactory solutions are yet to come. 
3.1 Specifying Behavior 
A prerequisite for any engineering process is the ability to describe the ‘hoped-for’ outcome of the 
endeavor. In software and systems engineering this calls for specifying the system’s behavior in 
some formal terms with agreed-upon semantics, or at the very least in very precise and technically-
oriented natural-language text. This is needed in virtually all stages and (possibly agile) activities 
of the process: requirements, design, simulation, testing, verification, and validation. Although 
numerous languages have been developed for this purpose – procedural, declarative logic-based, 
scenario-based, and more – we argue that in next-generation autonomous systems the very 
specification of desired, undesired, or even actual observed behavior introduces new challenges 
that call for extensive research and development of languages and tools.  These challenges include 
the following:    
1. Individual Goal Specification.  When it comes to complex autonomous systems, the 
specification of even a simple single goal is hard. Assume that, for the first time, an employer 
wants to replace a cleaning person with a robot. What kinds of specification are we after? 
Should it be action oriented (e.g., where and how to sweep), ‘object’ oriented (e.g., what kinds 
of dirt, dust and hair, etc., should be removed, and where from), or result oriented (e.g., what 
should the floors and shelves look like once the job is done)? How should one tell developers 
(and the system) about the need to move small objects, or unplug devices that are in the way, 
or about dealing with risks like breaking something?  We believe that the answer lies in 
  
comprehensive domain-specific ontologies of objects, properties, actions and relations, with 
textual and graphic languages (which may not be very different from current languages), for, 
so to speak, describing the world and its associated behaviors. A key feature of these languages 
should be powerful abstraction and generalization, which should alleviate the need to specify 
every detail about every variations in and new kinds of objects, properties, and events in the 
environment. Another important feature of these languages and ontologies is extensibility, 
allowing developers of systems in new areas to fill the ontological gaps, and then share their 
solutions with the community. Clearly, one should add, such languages will be of great value 
also in developing pervasive non-autonomous systems, such as IoT.  
 
2. Multi-Goal Management. As mentioned earlier, autonomous systems have to deal with 
multiple goals. However, beyond the difficulty of specifying each goal separately, it is still 
extremely difficult to specify how the system should balance, prioritize, or weigh the 
competing goals under a bewildering multitude of circumstances. Even in a single given 
situation, and even if we allow the use of natural language, it is often close to impossible to 
state what the system should or should not do. Recalling, for example, the FFAV facing 
complex decisions with great human and business risks, we doubt that stakeholders can 
prescribe in advance what the system should do. In addition to these technical issues of 
specification, there are also weighty ethical issues. Courts of law often debate extensively 
whether a specific decision made by a human, in one particular situation, was right or wrong, 
negligent or not, in line with what is expected of a reasonable person. This becomes 
significantly harder in autonomous systems, which, for example, have to determine where to 
cut a tissue during a surgical procedure, or decide in a split second between two very bad 
alternatives in an emergency driving situation.  
 
Dealing with such challenges could be attempted first by adding (as expected) weights, 
priorities, and mutual constraints to individual goals and sets thereof, as well as endowing the 
system components responsible for the various goals with dynamic internal negotiation 
capabilities.  A key role will also be played by mechanisms for specifying and handling 
contingent behavior, which reacts to and handles negative conditions directly related to the 
system’s own actual behavior and choices. The ability to provide concise explanations of the 
system’s decisions, both in real time and after the fact, will be of great value, allowing 
developers, and the system itself, to judge the programmed decisions and adjust them as 
needed. 
 
There is a very important issue that will have to be dealt with in a serious and deep way, in 
preparation for next generation autonomous systems, and which is clearly outside the scope 
of this paper.  Since many kinds of such systems will, in a way, “make their own rules”, the 
entire development process must take into account all relevant ethical/moral, legal, social, and 
political issues. Further, we will have to consider changes to systems (autonomous and non- 
autonomous) other than the one we are developing, and perhaps also to the rules and 
regulations of normal human life. Pedestrian traffic lights, and now-largely-illegal cellphone 
jamming in theatres, are examples of how humans may be externally forced to change their 
ways, in the presence of machines.  
 
  
    
. 
3. Capturing Emergent Behavior. During simulations, and often, subconsciously, stakeholders 
look for emergent properties and unexpected behaviors, which were not mentioned in the 
development process, and which may reflect problems or opportunities.  For example, when 
observing the behavior of an autonomous vehicle, such as an FFAV or a golf cart, one may 
notice that sometimes it repeats a path with unusual precision, which creates unexpected wear 
on the floor, ground or grass. New requirements may be specified as a result, such as 
randomizing paths, documenting a limited set of supported surfaces, or taking advantage of 
this kind of predictability in other parts of the system. Also, humans are good at observing 
obstacles and near-accident conditions that the system should have noticed, but probably did 
not, again leading to improved specifications.  
Resolving this is not easy. It is not even clear how to specify a formal version of a trouble 
ticket, which describes an event, property or pattern that was noticed by the human but was 
not part of the original specification. Furthermore, in the STV&V stages (simulation, testing, 
verification and validation – discussed later), where, due to the enormous range of execution 
paths, extensive automation is expected, one would want to automate the detection of 
emergent properties as well. For anticipated behavior (desired or undesired) this would be 
quite similar to testing, but for unexpected behavior, automating the capturing itself in a 
formal, yet succinct and intuitive way, would appear to be impossible unless we have an 
adequate specification of unexpected behavior.               
 
In fact, we believe that Knuth's famous quote, “Beware of bugs in the above code; I have only 
proved it correct, not tried it,” goes beyond recognizing the importance of testing given the 
limitations of formal methods and correctness proofs. It can be used to support our belief that 
testing a program is a must also because it yields totally new insights about what the program 
(and in our case, the autonomous system) does and does not do.   
 
Related to the issue of detecting and formalizing emergent behavior is, again, the issue of 
explainability and interpretability. This is especially relevant in the case of neural nets and of 
other ‘black-box’ solutions. Explanations summarize aspects of observed behaviors or of 
execution paths that dictate certain behavioral rules on certain inputs. In a way, explanations 
induce a model on the seemingly model-less machine-learning solution. And here too, 
summarizing such execution patterns automatically, in a way that is both formal and intuitive 
(as opposed to, say, presenting a large finite-state machine) is a challenging problem that is 
the object of active research. 
To address these difficulties the foundation should thus offer: 
1. Domain-specific ontologies for describing overall goals, desired and undesired behaviors 
and outcomes, and actual observed system and environment behavior.  
2. Languages, within which these ontologies can be used with proper abstractions and 
generalizations, and which also allow for specifying weights, priorities, constraints, and 
other balancing techniques for considering multiple goals.   
  
3. Compilers and interpreters for making these goal specifications executable, either as they 
are or after (automatically) decomposing them into agent/component-level goals.     
4. Emergent behavior monitors and detectors, i.e., tools for automated extraction from 
sequences of events (or from videos or other sensor information) symbolic and concise 
descriptions of actual actions and behaviors (and patterns thereof) which are not mentioned 
in the specification and testing procedures as required, forbidden or allowed.   
 
3.2 Controlling Execution in Simulation, Testing and Verification  
Simulation, testing, formal verification of system models, and system validation against users’ and 
customers’ tacit needs and expectations (STV&V), will be of paramount importance for next 
generation autonomous systems. As is well-known, none of these techniques provides complete 
assurances, so they will have to be used in ways that complement each other.   
Simulation provides flexible controllability and observability. It also facilitates observing 
emergent, both desired and undesired, not-yet-specified behaviors, in a variety of conditions. 
However, the simulated environment will always be an abstraction and simplification of reality.  
Validating that a system does ‘what the user wanted in the first place’ is in itself a difficult task, 
since the real original wishes (and hopes) may remain tacit, and may or may not be reflected in the 
requirements documents and the specifications. The growing popularity of agile development 
methods stems, in part, from the fact that there are needs that users may not be able to state 
explicitly until they see an actual implementation or prototype that does not meet those very needs.  
STV&V involves executing a system or a model thereof in a controlled manner, and/or traversing 
its possible states. It is an indispensable element of development, still, despite the availability of 
many excellent tools and methodologies, carrying out satisfactory STV&V for next generation 
autonomous systems calls for foundational work. The challenges stem from essentially two major 
issues:  
The vast number of objects and variables:  Autonomous systems have to deal with a multitude 
of new objects and variables that are often ignored, simplified, or controlled in other systems. Each 
of these variables may itself be hard to control over the range of possible values. Just think of an 
FFAV deployed at a busy outdoors factory yard, with people, equipment, and vehicles moving 
around, with distinct shapes, colors, reflections, textures, sizes, locations, positioning and routes. 
Faithful testing or simulation of these system and environment is a formidable task.  
  
The even greater number and intricacy of interactions: What the system itself does 
intentionally and explicitly may be reasonably controlled (e.g., in the case of the FFAV: pick up, 
travel, drop off, etc.). However, the number and complexity of the possible interactions and 
indirect effects between all objects in the environment and the system, are mind-boggling. 
Consider testing a very small FFAV working its way through a moving crowd of humans and 
machines, and perhaps other living creatures – as in a livestock show. The interactions are not 
constrained to “merely” reaching a destination, avoiding collisions and abiding by traffic laws (and 
between these there are already countless configurations and parameter values). Testing and 
  
simulation should be able to check and detect other kinds of interactions too. For example, whether 
the FFAV might splash passersby when it crosses a puddle, or if it can startle them – quietly and 
suddenly showing up at their side – or if it may get entangled in loose fabric or rope, or perhaps if 
it repeats certain route segments with unnecessary precision that causes the grass to wear out. Yet 
another relevant form of interaction is events causing the dynamic creation/appearance or 
destruction/disappearance of objects in particular circumstances, along with these objects’ 
subsequent interaction with others. 
The foundation should address the following key issues regarding STV&V,  
1) Modeling Environments  
 
Modeling environments should support the basic concepts that help specify, and then program, all 
these execution controls, in a consistent manner, across multiple application domains. They should 
integrate domain-specific libraries per various kinds of systems, tasks, environments, and contexts. 
Such libraries should be able to deal with the physical 3D space of real-world objects, basic motion 
and mobility, etc., in a variety of types of environments, such as transportation, medicine, home 
maintenance, manufacturing, person-to-person interaction, and many more.  
 
Furthermore, modeling environments should offer adequate languages and their supporting tools 
for building system models from predefined heterogeneous components of agents and objects (at 
different levels of abstraction).  
The modeling language should allow expression of coordination between components, including 
interaction between components as well as system reconfiguration features; e.g. creation/deletion 
of components, mobility and migration. The coordination language should be applicable to 
describing pre-known behaviors (e.g., knowledge and assumptions about the environment), as well 
as intended behaviors (e.g., those hopefully resulting from the programmed system). 
 
The modeling language should allow achieving a desired level of realism by changing abstraction 
levels and simulation granularity. This implies multilevel and multiscale modeling, supporting 
heterogeneous and dynamically rich behavior – in particular, cyber physical behavior – and to do 
so on different levels of timing abstractions, from synchronous or timed to fully asynchronous or 
untimed. 
Modeling languages should exhibit flexibility that goes far beyond that of traditional object-centric 
approaches, allowing, say, the description of group behavior (e.g., of a queue or a platoon), and 
focusing on the emergent interactions (e.g., collision or collision avoidance), rather than on single 
agents and objects and their individual perspectives (e.g., being at particular location or moving in 
a certain direction and at a certain speed).   
 
Other abilities that the languages should support include specification of scenarios for controlling 
the execution as well as means for expressing clearly the simplifications made in the given 
specification compared to reality (for example, limiting variable ranges and environment actions, 
assumptions on the probability of certain events, etc.).  
 
2) State-aware infrastructure for STV&V 
 
  
Controlled execution and traversal of states following the above discussion requires a major 
infrastructure in its own right. The foundation we call for should provide this, via rich 
environments for common domains, and tools for enriching such setups, so that one can test and 
simulate autonomous agents in interaction with the complex cyber physical environment for which 
they are being built. The test and simulation environments should be ‘state-aware’ and convenient; 
i.e. they should communicate with engineers using HCI interfaces and logs that specify and 
describe states, conditions, actions, events, etc., in intuitive terms. This should include the state of 
the external environment, the internal state of the system and its agents, and the state of agents’ 
perception of the external environment.  For example, assume you want to figure out what the 
FFAV will do when it faces an obstacle consisting of two posts placed at a distance apart that is 
just a small amount above FFAV’s width. Will it move between them or bypass them?  Standard 
testing and simulation techniques call for actually placing the obstacles and observing the system’s 
behavior. However, unless we also carefully check the feedback from the tested system as to what 
it ‘thinks’ it saw, one cannot be sure if it perceived the conditions as intended. For example, the 
FFAV may indeed pass between the posts, but for the wrong reason: it might have misclassified 
one or both of the posts.   
 
Such perception control is, in fact, a particular case of a broader kind of state awareness, where 
the STV&V execution environment can report the system’s own state and that of the environment; 
can guide the operation of certain system components based on the states of others; and can report, 
and react to, meta information about what the system does and does not do, the system’s execution 
paths, etc. The complexity of this is amplified by the unpredictability of behavior and 
configuration. We believe that no explicit specification can cover the diversity and chaos of the 
real world. As a (relatively) simple example, how would we determine what states and interactions 
will occur in parallel to which others? Hence, the challenge remains: how does one create a 
simulator that can provide this kind of coverage?  
3) Testing  
 
Testing of simulated models or of real systems is of course critical. However, for autonomous 
systems that will be deployed worldwide in multitudes, we cannot expect testing to cover all 
possible circumstances. And as in formal verification, specifying and then checking that the 
response of the system-under-test to the given stimuli is indeed the expected one, covering all 
aspects of what was and was not done, and how it was done, presents a major challenge.  
We need metrics and criteria for evaluating the testing process. Software-testing criteria, such as 
coverage of the code (structural testing), meeting the pre-determined purposes of the testing 
(functional testing), and “volume of stimuli” (a sort of quantity-based testing – e.g., the number of 
miles driven in an AV test), are insufficient metrics for next generation autonomous systems. 
Instead, one of the things we would require, as a bare minimum, is a practical approach to 
measuring state coverage (for both system and environment), but here too, just the number or 
fraction of states covered will not suffice. 
To improve testing efficiency we need techniques for automatic generation of sets of scenarios, 
subject to criteria that can be external, i.e. from the environment and the real world, or internal, 
such as coverage of specification and implementation entities. Furthermore, we need support for 
accelerated metamorphic testing in physical environments, which, roughly, means checking 
  
thoroughly that the system behaves correctly for a given scenario, and can then quickly providing 
assurances for many other scenarios that differ from the basic scenario only by small physical 
changes. 
 
4)  Verification   
 Formal verification may help guarantee desired behavior under all possible conditions, but due to 
the state explosion problem it may apply only to components or to simplified models of the entire 
system. Also, as described earlier, it is hard to fully formalize all aspects of the system under 
verification, and it is even harder to specify the assertions that describe the desired behavior in 
terms that are readily aligned with the expectations of the human users and engineers. 
Verification and explanation of neural nets will be of paramount importance. We expect many next 
generation autonomous systems to have components based on machine learning and neural nets. 
To enable STV&V of such components, especially within complex systems, it is necessary to 
develop means for the formal verification of the correctness of neural nets, and for supplying 
adequate explanations of their internal behavior in terms aligned with the way engineers describe 
systems. These problems are long recognized as being very difficult, but there is an emerging field 
of research around them, whose initial results look very promising. To become part of our proposed 
foundation, however, the resulting techniques must reach a certain level of maturity and achieve 
broad acceptance.  
 
3.3 Combining Model-Driven and Data-Driven Approaches  
 
Conventional procedural software prescribes step-by-step processes and rules that are 
meticulously handcrafted and organized by humans. By contrast, machine learning (ML), and 
especially the use of neural nets (NN), results in complex machinery that is created by algorithms. 
There is now a growing call to find ways to combine the two techniques for modern systems, 
leveraging their relative advantages to complement each other [10, 22].  There is still a severe lack 
of detailed guidelines on how to do this, the combination being very different from integration 
practices in classical engineering. Due to the new challenges involved (see Section 2.3), the 
problem is exacerbated for next generation autonomous systems.  
Below are some of the differences between developing the traditional procedural, model-based 
solutions and the construction of ML-based ones, which must be bridged in order for one to be 
able to integrate the results of the two in a single cohesive system. To better concentrate on the 
integration issue, we make the assumption that many of the specific still-open research problems 
in each of them (like verification and explainability of neural nets) are already resolved.  
1) General life cycle. The stages that traditional software engineering methods call for –
requirements elicitation and specification, design, code, testing, etc., whether in the 
traditional waterfall and V-shaped models or agile/spiral ones – do not yet include activities 
  
related to machine learning, such as the collection, validation and sampling of training data, 
the actual training (with evaluation and re-training), etc.  
 
2) Requirements specification. There are deep differences between requirements 
specification in classical software engineering and in the ML setting, and these issues are 
distinct from the general issues discussed in Section 3.1 around requirements for next 
generation autonomous systems3.1. Consider even simple specifications, like the one 
stating that an electrical switch must close when the temperature reaches 80 degrees, or the 
one stating that the brakes must be activated when a stationary obstacle is sensed and the 
stopping distance at the current speed is less than 1 second. These are well defined, and 
engineers can translate them easily into working components in more than one way.  
However, for a system containing an end-to-end component that was trained to handle 
excessive heat or avoid collision based on positive and negative examples, it is not at all 
clear how to specify what the component has to do, either before it is built or when it tested. 
This issue is also related to the explainability and interpretability of ML, discussed next.   
 
3) Explainability and interpretability. Generally speaking, explainability and 
interpretability of a system refer to the ability to describe what the system does, articulate 
the underlying mechanisms it uses (i.e., algorithms, computations, etc.), and/or justify a 
given decision it takes. Neural nets can be very successful for complex tasks, but their 
internal workings are often a mystery, resulting, as they were, from ML techniques that use 
extensive training and adjustments. While much research is being devoted these days to 
explainability and interpretability of neural nets, it is still a far cry from the situation with 
traditional programming, for which engineering practices recommend writing code that is 
easy to read and understand, and to enhance it with ample comments. We believe that for 
very large neural nets, even when explainability/interpretability tools are eventually able 
to extract the tacit rules behind the arcane computation, the relation between these rules 
and the neural net’s actual mechanisms will be very different from the relation between the 
source code of a conventional module in a high level programming language and lower 
level code into which it was compiled.   
 
4) Decomposability. Closely related to the differences around explainability are differences 
around the mindsets associated with the traditional model-based and the ML data-based 
approaches.  In model-based designs, most system artifacts can be hierarchically 
decomposed into well understood functional and structural elements, the role of which in 
the local function or in the bigger picture is more-or-less clear. Such decomposition is 
desired during almost all stages of the development effort. On the other hand, designing 
ML data-based solutions is typically accompanied with an end-to-end mindset, be it for an 
entire system or for a particular problem. Decomposing a machine-learning solution into 
meaningful parts may be an interesting challenge derived from explainability or 
verification goals, but it is not an intuitively expected result of the actual development of 
the solution.  
 
5) Testing and verification. The difficulty in specifying the behavior of neural nets makes it 
very difficult to test or to verify their correct behavior. While some exciting work has been 
  
done on checking properties thereof (see, e.g., [13] , the very concepts of testing and 
verifying neural nets still require extensive research.  
 
6) Trustworthiness and Certification. Trustworthiness and certification are closely related, 
of course, to testing and verification, but they deserve a separate discussion. Many kinds 
of autonomous systems are highly critical---Failure to meet their expected behavior can be 
disastrous. Currently, critical system design calls for taking special care to provide the 
trustworthiness guarantees that are required by standards, e.g. DO178B, FAA certification 
and ISO 26262 for the safety of electronic components in the automotive industry. The 
engineering of most critical systems relies on model-based techniques that give rise to 
predictability at design time. However, components based on machine learning are not 
engineered in the same way, and achieving an accepted level of trustworthiness and 
certification requires new technical solutions. The complexity and unpredictability 
associated with next generation autonomous systems prevent present end-to-end testing 
and simulation techniques from being adequate. Complementary non-technical measures, 
such as risk management, the concept of insurance, or the use of the justice system as 
deterrent against negligence, are a separate issue altogether and are outside of the scope of 
this paper.  
 
 
Consider a proposed solution that is to ultimately consist of both model-driven components (based, 
e.g., on an object model, algorithms, scenarios, rules, and decision tables) and a ML data-driven 
components (based, e.g., on neural nets), where each addresses a separate part of the problem 
space. At some point, the engineers have to decide which sub-problems should be solved using 
which of the two approaches. Sometimes the answer is easy: for example, reading traffic signs 
may be fully ML-based, while the decision to remain below a known speed limit can be model 
based. Staying in lane on a clean well-marked highway might be model-based, while negotiating 
a road surface covered with sand should probably be ML-based. However, in many cases the 
choice between these two approaches will be a lot more difficult. Besides, the means for deciding 
which situation is the relevant one in order to activate the proper component (e.g., whether the 
road surface is clean or sandy), will itself be either via model-based or ML-based, and this has to 
be decided upon by the designers too.  
4 Related Work  
The existence of gaps between state of the art and achieving desired trustworthiness has been 
articulated, e.g., by Neumann [20] and Bellovin and Neumann [2], with a focus on component 
vulnerability, the impact on composite-system vulnerability. In these papers the authors propose 
that certain classical, general engineering principles, be applied to help address these. The current 
paper expands on this discussion of general principles, and proposes building concrete new 
elements of an engineering foundation, and of models of autonomous systems and their 
environments, which could be directly used in enhancing systems trustworthiness.   
 
  
Many definitions have been offered for autonomy and agency (see, e.g.,[16, 9]). In Chapter 2 we 
have introduced definitions of autonomous systems concepts to enable the ensuing discussion. 
Autonomous systems have been studied in many contexts and perspectives. Autonomic Computing 
(see, e.g., [5]) focusses on computer systems and networks capable of self-management, and in 
particular, automating dynamic configuration.  The broad research of multi-agent systems (see, 
e.g., [23]) pays a special attention to how (autonomous) agents can combine local goals with 
collaboration rules and distributed algorithms to achieve system-wide overall goals. Autonomy is 
often associated with self-awareness (see, e.g, [14]), which then translates to a system being able 
to use its own overall states as input to further decisions. Symbiotic Computing (see, e.g., [6]) 
studies how autonomous systems can interface collaborate with humans and complex 
organizations, discussing many technical, commercial, and ethical implications. Further, entire 
conferences and journals are dedicated to the topic of autonomous systems (see, e.g.,  [1]). 
However, in these bodies of work about how to build and test complex, autonomous, safety-critical 
systems, it is still hard to find theories and tools for building confidence (or trust) in the system’s 
totally-unsupervised decision making when it faces unpredictable conditions and events. 
 
In testing autonomous systems the focus is achieving coverage: of behavioral elements of the 
system itself (e.g., all its potential actions and sequences thereof), of physical system components 
(methods and lines of code), and of the already known and already predicted conditions and events 
in the environment. E.g., DeepTest [27], is able to discover undesired behaviors in deep neural 
nets by analyzing deep neural nets and intelligently exploring the effects of changes in the known 
conditions.  Another angle of the effort to reach extensive coverage, can be seen in the how makers 
of autonomous vehicles present the number of real and simulated miles driven by these vehicles. 
This should imply that random and real world scenarios that the tested system experienced would 
exceed dramatically those experienced by a driving student or by a typical driver throughout their 
lifetime (see, e.g., [15],[28]). However, additional information is needed in order to independently 
confirm that the probability that any autonomous vehicle around the world will encounter an 
untested scenario, and will mishandle it, is sufficiently small.  
We are not aware of extensive and systematic engineering handling of the very principles that 
stand behind unpredictability. Nevertheless, demonstrations and discussions of autonomous 
systems, with their failures and successes, may implicitly highlight not just how complex, but how 
unpredictable, a situation may be. E.g., in the SpotMini video [3] (and in the critical discussion of 
its demonstration environment in [21]), one can see how a soda can that is accidentally opened 
causes confusion, and be alerted to the myriad other things that could happen.  
Directions towards common domain-specific languages, ontologies, models and behavioral 
scenarios in the area of autonomous systems can be seen in, e.g., Traffic Sequence Charts language 
[7],  USA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) scenarios [18], Autoware 
open source software for autonomous vehicles [12], and open source simulators like CARLA [8]. 
These solutions however are not integrated with each other, each using its own terms and concepts, 
as building blocks in a bottom-up tool construction. We intend for the proposed foundation to be 
provide a top down approach for concepts that cut across all aspects of autonomous systems and 
autonomous behavior.  
  
There are numerous simulation tools for autonomous systems, see, e.g., for autonomous driving, 
open source CARLA [8], Paracosm [17], HEXAGON MSC [11], and COGNATA [4].  Such 
simulators can provide synthetic and/or real-world sensor data (like camera images, GPS and 
LiDAR) to a driving ego car, which feeds back its actions like acceleration and steering, which in 
turn allows the simulator to update the scene accordingly. Some of the tools also offer a physics 
engine – which automatically enhances behaviors. Simulators offer a variety of built-in scenes and 
scenarios, as well as APIs/languages and interactive tools for engineers to further control the test 
environment. The PARACOSM tool provides an additional key capability: systematically 
exploring the environment-parameters’ space (including combinations therein), through planned 
sampling, in search for undesired behavior. While such simulators are important in testing and 
otherwise observing autonomous behavior, the proposed foundation calls for enhanced and 
additional important capabilities, like (a) substantial extension of the range of user control over 
environment variability as presently synthetic scenes often appear over-simplified, and scenes 
derived from real images are less controllable;  (b) the ability to externally create a mapping of 
how the simulated environment is reflected in the ‘mind’ of the system under test (=SUT; the ego 
car in the case of AV); (b) automated detection and evaluation of emergent  properties of the 
behavior of the SUT, and which was not in the test specification (e.g., was the driving of the tested 
car erratic in some not-yet-specified way? or, were other road users unreasonably forced to change 
their behavior in order to accommodate the tested car behavior?). Another limitation is the fact 
that many sophisticated functions are presently spread across multiple tools. Approaches for  
solutions are described  in [19], in the context of the CPS Wind Tunnel tool (CPSWT), the 
MOSAIK smart grid simulator, and Modelica’s Functional Mockup Unit (FMU).   
 
The proposed foundation will both draw from, and contribute to, the many published results, 
working tools, and industry standards, that already deal with various perspectives of autonomous 
systems. In its more straightforward (but still significant and hard to accomplish) aspect, the 
foundation will consolidate best practices, distill underlying principles, and highlight unique 
solutions. However, its greater contribution will be in that it will introduce new solutions for topics 
like: how to specify (or document) desired and observed properties and behavior in an ever-
changing (and unpredictable) environment; how to create complex, yet transparent, domain-
specific models, with abstractions that accommodate entities that do not yet exist; and, how to be 
able to express, react to, and control, the state of the system and its environment in requirements, 
code, tests, simulations and documents.  
In this paper we have argued that closing certain gaps is mandatory step on the road to development 
and ubiquitous deployment of next-generation autonomous systems. We are well aware that there 
could be a wide range of opinions by engineers, company leaders, governments and regulators, 
and the public at large, about what measures are absolutely necessary to achieve basic 
trustworthiness. Combinations of insurance to compensate for errors and omissions, and reliance 
on a justice system to strengthen stakeholder accountability, may indeed enable deployments of 
autonomous systems using current practices without technological breakthroughs. Testimony to 
such risk-related deliberations appears, e.g., in an article covering the Waymo-vs-Uber case [29] 
(which we cite here without expressing our own opinion on the case or on the quoted positions). 
Another alternative measure is of course constraining system autonomy, and keeping ultimate 
human responsibility as an essential part of decision making processes. In this paper we argue that 
  
the new foundation should deal directly with concrete measures for dealing with trustworthiness, 
in the face of complexity and unpredictability. This should, in turn, accelerate the deployment and 
acceptance of systems that can be considered autonomous.  
5 CONCLUSION 
Next-generation autonomous systems are imminent, given the obvious need to further automate 
existing organizations, by gradually replacing human operators by autonomous agents. Such 
systems are often critical and are expected to manage dynamically changing and possibly 
conflicting goals, which reflects the transition from “narrow” or “weak” AI to “strong” or 
“general” AI. These systems will have to cope with the uncertainty of complex, unpredictable 
cyber physical environments, and will have to adapt to multiple goals. And they will have to 
harmoniously collaborate with human agents, giving rise to so-called “symbiotic” autonomy. 
Classical software and systems engineering will need to be thoroughly revised. Existing design 
techniques are model-based, mostly applicable to small sized and centralized automated systems, 
with predictable environments and well-understood specifications. Such techniques cannot be 
applied as is to next generation autonomous systems, for many reasons: They inevitably rely on 
the use of ML-enabled components, which, as a rule, do not admit model-based characterizations, 
and their geographic distribution and mobility require network infrastructure of extremely high 
trustworthiness, which is a far cry from the current situation.   
Autonomous vehicles provide an emblematic topical case, illustrating the challenge that involves 
huge economic stakes and deep societal impact. Public authorities allow “self-certification” for 
autonomous vehicles, whose manufacturers often adopt “black-box” ML-enabled end-to-end 
design approaches. They frequently consider statistical evidence to be enough for trustworthiness: 
“I've driven a hundred million miles without an accident, so it's safe.” Furthermore, critical 
software can be customized by updates which may be designed and added with even less scrutiny. 
The software for Tesla cars, for example, may be updated on a monthly basis. 
All this has generated lively public debates. Many important voices tend to minimize the risks 
from the lack of rigorous design methods: Some claim that we should accept the risks because the 
benefits will be far bigger! Others exhibit blind faith in empirical methods and argue that rigorous 
approaches to complex problems are inherently inadequate. Some people are overoptimistic, 
arguing that we really do have the right tools, and it is just a matter of time.3 
Our central argument is that advent of next generation autonomous systems raises an extraordinary 
scientific and technical challenge. The degree of success in meeting this challenge will ultimately 
determine the extent of acceptance of such systems, as a compromise between their estimated 
                                                 
3  “I almost view [autonomous cars] as a solved problem. We know what to do, and we’ll be there in a few 
years.”  E. Musk, Nvidia Technology Conference, March 2015.  
 
  
trustworthiness, the anticipated benefits of the automation they afford, and the required changes in 
other systems and in human behavior. 
The paper’s contribution is twofold. First, we propose a basic terminology for next generation 
autonomous systems, and a framework capturing their main characteristics. The framework 
provides insight into the spectrum of possibilities between automation and autonomy, and is 
intended to help in understanding the degree of autonomy of a system as the division of work 
between a system and human agents.  
Second, we advocate the need for a new scientific and engineering foundation that will address the 
key open issues in the engineering of next generation autonomous systems. Such an autonomics 
foundation will hopefully lead to trustworthy hardware/software systems, which are reactive and 
integrate model-based cyber physical and ML-enabled components. We argue that such a 
foundation cannot be obtained merely by combining these approaches, which have focused on 
software systems that, for the most part, fall under the headings of autonomic computing, adaptive 
systems and autonomous agents. 
We anticipate that forming this foundation will require major and ground-breaking efforts in three 
main directions.  
The first direction is to develop a rigorous theory and supporting tools for dealing with 
heterogeneous specifications. These should make it possible to characterize system behavior in a 
broad fashion, including the behavior of its individual agents as well as the system’s global 
behavior in terms of its overall goals and its emergent properties. 
The second direction is aimed at providing sufficient evidence of a system’s trustworthiness. 
Existing formal verification methods are vastly inadequate, being applicable only to subsystems 
of moderate complexity and suffering from well-known limitations aggravated by the use of ML-
components. Hence, we emphasize the paramount importance of modeling and simulation: on the 
one hand, faithful, realistic modeling is needed so that behavior will be accurate and will appear 
true to life; on the other hand, semantic awareness is needed so that the experimenter has access 
to a meaningful abstraction of the system’s dynamics, allowing controllability and repeatability of 
the testing. The latter will also allow notions of coverage that measure the degree to which relevant 
system configurations have been explored.  
The third direction of the effort required for the foundation involves moving from traditional 
system design to “hybrid” design, seeking tradeoffs between the trustworthiness of classical 
model-based approaches and the performance of data-based ML ones. Currently, the less-than-
adequate applicability of rigorous model-based approaches to complex systems has led to the 
development of end-to-end ML-enabled autonomous systems, which comes too with major 
disadvantages. Taking better advantage of each approach requires the development of common 
architectural frameworks that would integrate modules characterized by their pure functionality 
independent of their design approach. Developing the theory for decomposability and 
interoperability as well as explainability of data-based modules is essential for reaching this goal.  
  
In summary, we are definitely at the beginning of a revolution, where machines are called upon to 
progressively replace humans in their capacity for situation awareness and adaptive decision 
making. This is a first step toward general AI, which goes far beyond the objectives of ML-enabled 
intelligence. The role of autonomous systems will depend on choices we make about when we 
trust them and when we do not. Giving ourselves the means to make informed decisions is 
essential. 
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